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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to identify two steps which are common to the path of all failing firms and result from 
their financial statements. Their identification support the explanation of business failure (in both 
fraud and no-tort cases) as encouraged by authoritative literature (Cybinski, 2001; Parker, 2012). 
The analysis has been conducted through all the fraud cases (and the matched not-tort cases) 
mentioned by WebBRD. It has been developed through different phases: content analysis for the 
identification and categorization of micro-failures, a deep analysis of time variable and the 
implementation of survival analysis for the failing path explanation.  
This paper shows that, during the failing path, firms encounter two “steps” (i.e. micro-failures and 
macro-failures) that make the process neither atypical nor sudden at the same time. After the 
identification of the relevant micro-failures, a survival analysis has been implemented to demonstrate 
that fraud lets firms earn time in the path to macro-failure, but its disclosure makes firms fall down 
macro-failure very fast.  
This paper sight to encourage business failure explanation and fraud deterrence: fraud lets firms earn 
time and hope more to avoid macro-failure, but, after the disclosure moment, fraud firms fall down 
macro-failure faster than not-tort firms. The results suggest that only after a such explanation of 
business failure, its prediction can be properly conducted. 
This paper examines in an original way failure as a path and emphasizes relations between time 
dimension, failure stages and accounting information**. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Business failure has traditionally been considered a 
sudden and atypical event the analysis and prediction 
of which are very difficult to manage. In fact, 
business failures continue to happen in spite of the 
high number of prediction models. The most 
commonly  used techniques of prediction are 
characterized by different degrees of accuracy and 
practicality and can be divided into two categories: 
statistical and machine learning methods (Lin and 
McClean, 2001). They aim to find a way to early 
detection of corporate financial distress. 
Consequently, most of the literature about failure 
attempts to create substantial agreement over the 
most suitable methodology for predicting business 
failure (Aziz and Dar, 2006).  
However, a smaller number of researchers have 
emphasized the importance of the time dimension for 
failure, which should be considered a process. 
Moreover, the part of the literature that has sought to 
gain deeper insight into the failure process of a 
company is mostly qualitative, related to the 
managerial-organizational field. This study attempts 
to fill the gap: it examines failure as a path and 
emphasizes relations between the time dimension, 
failure stages and accounting numbers. 
This paper examines failure as a path: it 
identifies two ―common steps‖ (micro-failures and 
macro-failures) thanks to information gathered 
through failing firms‘ financial statements. Such 
failure stages make the process neither atypical nor 
sudden at the same time. The temporal dimension is 
of great importance and must be considered: time 
makes failure a sequence of steps instead of a single-
still event. So, it allows failing firms to act and react 
and it lets failure be different from final bankruptcy. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the 
following section, there is an overview of the 
literature. This is followed by a description of the 
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sample and of the methodology applied. Then, the 
findings are discussed and some suggestions for 
further research are provided.    
 
2 Prior and related research 
 
The prior research that is related to the topic of this 
paper is dated because it refers especially to the 
definition of failure. This has been traditionally 
considered an atypical and sudden event that 
characterizes the end of the life cycle of firms. 
It is atypical  (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980) 
because it presents particular features according to 
the internal factors and external environment of the 
failing firms (Nelson 1991). In fact, the prediction of 
failure has required the consideration of the firm's 
size (Edmister, 1972; Beaver, 1968), age (Altman, 
1968; Thornhill and Amit, 2003; Yuji, 2000), 
ownership structure (Mata and Portugal, 1994), 
industry (Beaver, 1968; Platt and Platt, 1991), market 
(e.g. monetary policy and investors' expectations), 
country (Gilbert et al., 1990). The interaction between 
internal and external factors, which characterizes and 
causes corporate failure, has been widely analyzed 
(Argenti, 1976; Sharma and Mahajan, 1980; 
Thornhill and Amit, 2003). 
It seems sudden (Sharma and Mahajan, 1980) 
because many financial scandals are discovered only 
when substantial losses have already affected 
creditors and stockholders. Thus, the need to provide 
ample warning to the interested parties has long 
represented the main reason for seeking good 
methods of prediction. These should predict potential 
business failures as early as possible to reduce losses 
(Deakin, 1972). On the other hand, the inability to 
predict is not the only cause of a sudden 
announcement; this can be also due to the 
unwillingness to disclose (Asare, 1990). In both cases 
the event is suddenly announced (Hossari, 2007), but, 
as shown in this paper, it is the result of a gradual 
process that may extend over years. 
The consideration of failure as an event has been 
a constant from the beginning of the failure literature. 
Beaver (1968) defines failure as a business defaulting 
on interest payments on its debt, overdrawing its bank 
account, or declaring bankruptcy. Along the same 
lines, Blum (1974) defines failure as "entrance into a 
bankruptcy proceeding or an explicit agreement with 
creditors which reduced the debts of the company". 
Other similar definitions speak about the cessation of 
operations by a business concern because of 
involvement in court procedures or voluntary actions 
which will result in loss to creditors (Sharma and 
Mahajan, 1980). Progressively, researchers have 
seized the importance of time as one of the main 
dimensions: Ismael et al. (1980) suggest that the 
stability of financial ratios over time considerably 
improves the ability of the discriminant function to 
predict failure. Moreover, other dated literature 
contributions (Argenti 1976; Laitinen, 1991) consider 
alternative types of failure processes according to the 
behaviour of different financial ratios: capturing the 
important dimensions or factors, which affect the 
financial ratios of failing firms, makes it possible to 
identify different failure processes. However , some 
literature might not appreciate the identification of 
alternative failure processes in a sample of failed 
firms: a common uniform concept of failure reduces 
uncertainty and the risk of inaccuracy in failure 
prediction models. Only more recent literature 
contributions have definitely taken the time variable 
into account (Hill, 1996; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 
2008). Bankruptcy is only a single and potential event 
at the end of a path of financial distress that is 
considered a series of events that reflect various 
stages of corporate adversity (Turetsky, 2001). These 
works emphasize the interdependence between 
internal and external factors during the failure path; 
but other literature contributions underline the 
difficulty in the development of a cause-effect 
relationship between attributes that may cause or be 
related to bankruptcy (Mckee 2000): relevant 
attributes can be difficult to identify and measure also 
because they may occur in one or more time periods 
prior to bankruptcy.  
Starting from these considerations, the 
remainder of this paper addresses the definition and 
analysis of the failure process in order to identify 
only two steps that can be considered common to the 
path of all failing firms. The aim is to explain rather 
than predict: as highlighted by Cybinski (2001), 
researchers should be concerned with the explanation 
of how firms transform from surviving or even 
successful ones into failed ones. According to this 
author (i.e. Cybinski, 2001), understanding enterprise 
failure presents an enormous theoretical challenge 
that, at the moment, has largely gone unanswered 
because the studies have merely produced 
instruments for discriminating failed from prosperous 
firms: failure is not a well-defined dichotomous 
variable because there is a also a ―grey‖ area (i.e. the 
area of overlap or indecisive area) that should be 
reduced to a minimum.  
This contribution (i.e. Cybinski, 2001) analyzes 
failure as a methodological problem in order to find a 
proper statistical model, but its considerations 
represent the correct premise of the present work 
because they try to emphasize the relationship 
between time dimension, failure stages and 
accounting information. The present paper aims to 
consider both this stream of research and that 
(Humphrey, 2008) which  questions the relevance of 
quantitative modelling studies (to auditors, auditees, 
professional accounting associations and corporate 
regulatory authorities) both before and after the 
lesson of famous corporate scandals (e.g. Enron and 
WorldCom). In fact, the need for detailed qualitative 
contextual research on these crashes has been 
highlighted by authoritative literature (Lee, 2004; 
Humphrey, 2005; Parker, 2005): ―the qualitative 
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agenda has much to offer in unpacking these 
processes of accounting, auditing and accountability, 
and in addition translating qualitative management 
accounting issues and research designs into the 
financial accounting and auditing arenas.‖ (Parker, 
2012)   
 
3 Hypotheses 
 
The traditional stream of literature makes failure 
appear an instantaneous occurrence. This erroneous 
conviction can be due to a univocal definition of 
failure, which is usually considered the last stage of 
the life cycle of firms; but, with this meaning, it 
represents just one type of discontinuance which 
coincides with macro-failure. A firm definitely fails 
after a process which evolves over a period of time. 
Hypothesis 1 – The path to failure is 
characterized by one or more micro-failures and by 
one macro-failure which are all mentioned in the 
financial statements. So, failure is not both atypical 
and sudden at the same time. 
The traditional definition of business failure can 
be compared to the concept of macro-failure. This 
step of the failure path is defined in the paper as the 
last stage of a firm‘s life cycle: it represents an 
important type of discontinuance that, most of the 
time, requires a defensive reaction (i.e. a radical 
change) in the firm that wants to survive. It occurs 
after a process which evolves over a period of time.  
Hypothesis 1b – Macro-failure does not occur 
suddenly. 
After the definition of macro-failure, another 
concept of failure should be considered: it refers to 
the previous stage of not meeting some set objectives. 
Before arriving at macro-failure, firms encounter 
micro-failures that must be analyzed with attention as 
valuable signals as their identification surely gives 
more time to firms and stakeholders for a proper 
evaluation and resolution of the problem. ―If it is 
possible to recognize failing companies in advance 
then appropriate action to reverse the process can be 
taken before it is too late‖ (Taffler, 1982). For this 
reason, a deep analysis of the concept of micro-
failure must be made. 
Hypothesis 1a – Micro-failures are not atypical. 
As said before, a micro-failure represents the 
stage of not meeting some set objectives. 
Consequently, the analysis of micro-failures starts 
from the identification of a firm‘s (or its stakeholders) 
actions (or inactions) and the consequent missed 
objectives. According to this consideration, micro-
failures could incorrectly be compared with causes of 
failure: the difference between them is the same as 
that between causes and effects. If a micro-failure 
occurs, a failure cause has already happened and a set 
business objective has become unattainable. A 
categorization of micro-failures will be presented in 
Section V, but the (Table 1) shows some examples to 
give an insight into the difference between micro-
failures and business failure causes.  
 
Table 1. Examples of micro-failures and difference with business failure causes 
 
BUSINESS FAILURE CAUSES MICRO-FAILURES 
Product problems (timing, design, 
distribution/selling,….) 
Customers‘ criticism 
Negative economic-financial trends (primarily resulting 
from a decrease in revenues) 
Assuming debt too early 
Excessive indebtedness and difficulty in obtaining new 
financing 
 
All micro-failures must be taken into 
consideration because they represent missed 
objectives and they will impact on profit (because of 
variations in sales and expenses) and liquidity 
(because of variations in debt and cash flow). For this 
reason, as explained by the literature, great attention 
should be paid to different types of signals: 
economic-financial ratios and items; managerial 
events (e.g. the resignations of managers and/or 
auditors); other events (e.g. risky contentious 
procedures). Inside the set of micro-failures which 
characterizes a failing firm, there is a micro-failure 
that is especially relevant because it does influence 
the path to failure: as explained by the second 
hypothesis, after a relevant micro-failure has 
emerged, a firm must make a drastic choice: i.e. to 
reveal or not to reveal its negative consequences. So, 
relevant micro-failure (XMiF) represents the most 
reliable signal that a business failure process has 
started. It is a common step in all business failure 
paths: in no-tort cases, it represents the disclosure 
date, i.e. the moment in which the failure spiral starts 
turning. In fraud cases, it is the last micro-failure to 
be properly represented in financial statements. If a 
firm decides to manipulate accounting information 
after a micro-failure, it will gain time (i.e. there is an 
increase in the amount of time between micro-failure 
and macro-failure thanks to earnings management), 
but, when discovered, it will be worse off (i.e. the 
time between the disclosure of bad news and macro-
failure will be shorter in manipulation cases than in 
the true and fair view cases).  
Hypothesis 2 – Fraud lets firms gain time in the 
path to macro-failure. 
Hypothesis 2a – After relevant micro-failure, 
no-tort firms go toward macro-failure faster than 
fraud firms.  
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Hypothesis 2b – After the disclosure of the 
missed objectives, fraud firms fall into macro-failure 
faster than no-tort firms.  
In order to give insight into the second 
hypothesis meaning, its application to the considered 
sample, which will be described in the next section, 
can be figured out through a graph (Figure 1). The 
symbols in the graph require some explanation: 
- Xs represents a firm‘s successful state. This 
finds correct representation in financial reports (Rs)  
because firms want to show their good staying. 
- XMiF represents a common step in the business 
failure process. It is the most reliable signal that a 
business failure process has started and, in fraud 
cases, the last micro-failure that finds correct 
representation in financial reports (RMiF). 
- XMaF represents the firm‘s macro-failure which 
is correctly represented in financial reports (RMaF) 
because firms do not have alternatives in this final 
step of the failure process. 
 
 
Figure 1. Firms‘ Failing Path 
 
 
 
So, the paper focuses on three failure stages: A 
(for both fraud and no-tort cases) where failing firms 
encounter the relevant micro-failure; B (only for 
fraud cases) where firms disclose the fraud; C (for 
both fraud and no-tort cases) where failing firms fall 
into macro-failure. As emphasized in the conclusion 
of the paper, there may be failing firms which commit 
fraud and become again successful cases without 
having to disclose the use of improper accounting 
methods; these are very difficult to identify. Only a 
progressive deepening of the subject (inside the 
history of failing firms, their minor events and their 
stakeholders‘ actions) may help such identification: 
this paper represents an initial contribution for such 
investigation and for a new explanation of business 
failure. 
 
4 Sample 
 
The construction of the sample requires the use of 
several instruments and the progressive filtration of 
data through different steps which are described 
below. 
The WebBRD (Bankruptcy Research Database) 
contains data on all large, public company bankruptcy 
cases filed in the United States Bankruptcy Courts 
from October 1, 1979 to the present day. This dataset 
made it possible to consider all the large, public 
company bankruptcy cases filed through March 1, 
2010. These 882 cases have been distinguished 
according to the U.S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system, which represents a way 
of identifying the primary business of a company. 
Division H (Finance, insurance, and real estate) has 
not been considered in the construction of the sample 
because of specific regulations: 120 cases have been 
deleted because they belong to division H. These 
remaining cases can be separately analyzed thanks to 
the distinction in subsets proposed by WebBRD: the 
two subsets considered in this paper, have been 
labeled fraud cases and no-tort cases. 
There are 31 fraud cases mentioned by 
WebBRD and acting in a division different from the 
H. For each of them a deeper analysis has been made 
thanks to forms 10-k and other sources of financial 
data. These have been collected through two 
databases, i.e. Mergent‘s database and Accounting 
Research Manager (ARM). The second database has 
been used for six fraud cases mentioned by WebBRD 
whose financial data are not available on Mergent‘s 
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database. Successively, each case history and 
information was confirmed by Factiva, a global 
information resource, and thanks to information 
gathered from LexisNexis Academic. 
 
In order to investigate the path to macro-failure in 
both the mentioned directions (true-fair view and 
manipulation of accounting information as explained 
in Section III), a benchmark was selected for each 
fraud case: the choice inside the 762 bankrupt 
companies listed by WebBRD is based on two 
conditions such as the year of filing for bankruptcy, 
the SIC code and/or the description of business 
(Table 2). These are the same criteria used in 
Mergent‘s database for the identification of 
competitors. So, company details (such as business 
description, history and subsidiaries), annual reports 
and other financial data were analyzed also for the 
benchmarks. 
 
 
Table 2. The sample: fraud cases mentioned by WebBRD and matched no-tort cases 
 
 
ALL FRAUD CASES MENTIONED 
BY WebBRD 
SIC 
CODE 
YEAR OF 
FILING: 
BENCHMARKS (SELECTION OF 
COMPETITORS) 
1 Adelphia Business Solutions, Inc. 48 2002 ITC DeltaCom, Inc. 
2 Adelphia Communications Corp. 48 2002 IMPSAT Fiber Networks, Inc. 
3 American Banknote Corporation 27 1999 MediaNews Group Inc. 
4 American Tissue, Inc. 26 2001 American Pad & Paper Company 
5 Anicom, Inc. 50 2001 Inacom Corp. 
6 Aurora Foods Inc. 20 2003 Interstate Bakeries Corporation 
7 Bicoastal Corporation 38 1989 Tracor Holdings Inc. 
8 Bonneville Pacific Corporation 16 1991 Morrison Knudsen Corp. 
9 Boston Chicken, Inc. 58 1998 Flagstar Companies Inc. 
10 CareMatrix Corp. 83 2000 Sun HealthCare Group, Inc. 
11 Complete Management, Inc. 87 1999 ProMedCo Management Company 
12 Enron Corp. 51 2001 KCS Energy, Inc. 
13 Fine Host Corporation 58 1999 Planet Hollywood International Inc. 
14 Footstar Inc. 56 2004 Jacobson Stores, Inc. 
15 Global Crossing Ltd. 48 2002 Global TeleSystems, Inc. 
16 Hunt International Resources Corp.* 20 1985 Imperial Sugar Company 
17 Impath Inc. 80 2003 aaiPharma Inc. 
18 Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. 23 1993 Plaid Clothing Group Inc. 
19 MCSI Inc. 50 2003 CHS Electronics, Inc. 
20 MiniScribe Corp. 35 1990 Daisy Systems Corp. 
21 MobileMedia Communications, Inc. 48 1997 Geotek Communications, Inc. 
22 OCA, Inc. 80 2006 Mediq, Inc. 
23 Peregrine Systems, Inc. 73 2002 USInterNetworking, Inc. 
24 Philip Services Corp. (1999) 49 1999 Waste Systems International, Inc. 
25 Seitel Inc. 13 2003 Forcenergy, Inc. 
26 Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. 13 2002 Coho Energy, Inc. (2002) 
27 Smartalk Teleservices, Inc. 73 1999 GST Telecommunications, Inc. 
28 Sunbeam Corporation 36 2001 Sun Television and Appliances, Inc. 
29 Technical Equities Corp. 34 1986 Ladish Co. Inc. 
30 Washington Group International, Inc. 15 2001 WCI Communities, Inc. 
31 Worldcom, Inc. 48 2002 XO Communications, Inc. 
* The impossibility of data collection has implied the not consideration of one fraud case: Hunt International 
Resources Corp. filled for bankruptcy in 1985 and precise financial data about it cannot be gathered anymore. 
 
5 Method of analysis 
 
The sample analysis was developed through different 
phases: content analysis for the identification and 
categorization of micro-failures, a deep analysis of 
time variable and the implementation of survival 
analysis.  
According to the definition of micro-failure 
given in Section III and thanks to the triangulation of 
methods and information described in Section IV, 
micro-failures have been identified for each sampled 
firm. As emphasized above, micro-failures are 
different from failure causes, but, in order to show 
that they are not atypical, micro-failures can be 
categorized by considering the traditional causes 
clusters. So, the first step of the analysis identifies the 
categories of business failure causes traditionally 
considered by the literature (Argenti 1976; Altman 
1983) such as product/market, financial, 
managerial/key employee, cultural/social and 
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accidental problems. The second step of this analysis 
implies micro-failure identification (and 
categorization according to the mentioned ―traditional 
categories‖) thanks to a method concerning the 
content of accounting narratives (Jones and 
Shoemaker, 1994). This process is based on the 
general principles of content analysis, which 
represents a well-established method in the social 
sciences. Details and discussions about such method 
are provided by Boyatzis (1998), Holsti (1969), 
Krippendorff (1980) and Weber (1985). FASB (2001) 
has also emphasized the usefulness of such 
methodology in the disclosure of critical factors and 
other information used by companies to manage their 
operations.  
Content analysis implies the classification of 
text units into predetermined categories. For valid 
inferences to be drawn, the classification procedure 
must be reliable and valid: different people should 
code the text and produce similar results about what 
the study aims to represent. The classification 
procedure can vary from qualitative methods to 
quantitative ones that permit statistical analysis. In 
fact, content analysis can be of different types: 
computer-aided or human-coded. The second one has 
the advantage of enabling the quantitative assessment 
of achieved reliability. The present study involves a 
mixture of computer and manual analysis. Computer 
analysis is used principally to collect the frequency 
data. Manual analysis has been implemented for the 
semantic coding and analysis of the data: it was 
necessary to identify not only words, but also their 
context and attributions. Although extremely labour 
intensive, this method results in a more sensitive and 
subjective approach. A degree of subjectivity in any 
analysis of narrative information is inevitable as even 
computer-based approaches involving systematic 
counts of keywords require an element of judgment 
and interpretation.  
The coding procedure comprised two stages: the 
identification of the micro-failures and their 
categorization. In order to guarantee reliability of the 
present analysis a pilot test on a few annual reports 
was carried out. At least three coders were used. 
Table 3 was constructed starting from the traditional 
literature on business failure causes (as explained in 
the first step of the analysis) and employed by all the 
coders. Discrepancies were re-analyzed and the 
differences resolved (Milne and Adler, 1999). This 
method serves several purposes: for each sampled 
case the content analysis, applied to forms 10-k and 
other sources of financial data described in Section 
IV, has made it possible to identify micro-failures, the 
relevant micro-failure (according to the definition 
given in Section III) and the date when it happened 
(Table 4). 
 
Table 3. Micro-failures types listed according to the traditional failure causes clusters 
 
A. PRODUCT/MARKET PROBLEMS 
A1. Competition and/or competitors with significantly greater financial resources than the company 
A2. Customers‘ criticism because of goods quality (either too expensive or too low-quality) 
A3. Depressed industry and market downturn 
A4. New and stricter industry regulations 
A5. Seasonal business 
 
B. FINANCIAL PROBLEMS 
B1. Excessive costs and/or additional and not essential expenses 
B2. Excessive indebtedness and difficulty in obtaining new financing 
B3. Investors‘ nervousness, bad relationship with the venture capitalists and/or creditors‘ pressure  
B4. Negative economic-financial trends (primarily resulting from a decrease in revenues) 
B5. Relationship of strong financial dependence with another subject (suppliers, customers, …) 
B6. Unprofitable affairs (e.g. acquisition of unprofitable divisions) 
C. MANAGERIAL/KEY EMPLOYEE PROBLEMS 
C1. Conflicts of interests  
C2. Core business abandonment and diversification into other industries 
C3. Excessive anxiety to keep up with increasingly large competitors  
C4. Important decision without obtaining board approval 
C5. Legal, apparently correct but improper (e.g. deficit analytical) accountancy  
C6. Poor management and disengaged board 
C7. Principal‘s problems with justice for affairs different from the firm  
C8. Private benefits (withdrawals, bonuses and compensation policy) 
C9. Too aggressive growth and expansion strategy (i.e. a such rapid growth through mergers or other 
operations was no sustainable in the long run) 
C10. Too ambitious objectives and anxiety to hit "must make" numbers (i.e. earnings targets) 
C11. Wrong operations (because of riskiness or other reasons) 
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Table 3. Micro-failures types listed according to the traditional failure causes clusters (continuation) 
 
D. CULTURAL/SOCIAL FACTORS 
D1. Corruption 
D2. Discriminating problems  
D3. Powerful enemies 
 
E. ACCIDENTAL FACTORS 
E1.  Calamities 
 
Table 4. Relevant micro-failures: type and date for each sampled firm 
 
Fraud cases Date Type Matched not-tort cases Date Type 
Adelphia Business 
Solutions, Inc. 
01/01/1999 C9 ITC DeltaCom, Inc. 30/03/2000 B5 
Adelphia Communications 
Corp. 
01/10/1999 C9 IMPSAT Fiber Networks, Inc. 30/07/2001 A3 
American Banknote 
Corporation 
14/07/1998 C9 MediaNews Group Inc. 31/12/2007 A3 
American Tissue, Inc. 30/09/1999 C9 American Pad & Paper Company 30/06/1998 B5 
Anicom, Inc. 24/02/1998 C9 Inacom Corp. 09/10/1998 B6 
Aurora Foods Inc. 01/01/1998 C10 Interstate Bakeries Corporation 15/11/2003 B4 
Bicoastal Corporation 30/06/1986 C2 Tracor Holdings Inc. 01/10/1989 C6 
Bonneville Pacific 
Corporation 
31/07/1986 C8 Morrison Knudsen Corp. 20/10/1994 C6 
Boston Chicken, Inc. 04/08/1992 C9 Flagstar Companies, Inc. 15/08/1994 D3 
CareMatrix Corp. 28/04/1998 B2 Sun HealthCare Group, Inc. 01/07/1998 A4 
Complete Management, 
Inc. 
01/05/1996 C9 ProMedCo Management Company 30/06/2000 B4 
Enron Corp. 01/03/1997 C5 KCS Energy, Inc. 01/01/1998 B4 
Fine Host Corporation 01/01/1994 C9 Planet Hollywood International, Inc. 19/04/1996 C9 
Footstar Inc. 01/01/1997 B6 Jacobson Stores, Inc. 31/05/1997 B4 
Global Crossing Ltd. 01/01/1998 B6 Global TeleSystems, Inc. 04/03/1999 B2 
Impath Inc. 24/02/2000 C4 aaiPharma Inc. 13/02/2004 B4 
Leslie Fay Companies, Inc. 01/01/1990 A2 Plaid Clothing Group Inc. 19/11/1994 B4 
MCSI Inc. 30/06/2000 C9 CHS Electronics, Inc. 10/03/1999 C5 
MiniScribe Corp. 01/01/1986 C10 Daisy Systems Corp. 30/09/1989 B6 
MobileMedia Comm., Inc. 29/06/1995 C6 Geotek Communications, Inc. 26/11/1997 C2 
OCA, Inc. 30/09/1998 B3 Mediq, Inc. 29/05/1998 B6 
Peregrine Systems, Inc. 01/04/1999 C10 USInterNetworking, Inc. 01/09/2000 B6 
Philip Services Corp. 
(1999) 
26/02/1996 C8 Waste Systems International, Inc. 03/08/1999 B2 
Seitel Inc. 05/05/2000 C8 Forcenergy Inc 30/06/1997 B2 
Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc. 17/05/2001 B4 Coho Energy, Inc. (2002) 30/06/2001 B2 
Smartalk Teleservices, Inc. 01/01/1997 C9 GST Telecommunications, Inc. 28/10/1998 B2 
Sunbeam Corporation 30/09/1996 C10 Sun Television and Appliances, Inc. 07/01/1997 B1 
Technical Equities Corp. 01/01/1983 C2 Ladish Co. Inc. 30/09/1991 B4 
Washington Group Intern., 
Inc. 
28/09/1999 B6 WCI Communities, Inc. 30/09/2006 B2 
Worldcom, Inc. 01/01/1999 C10 XO Communications, Inc. 16/06/2000 B2 
 
6 Results 
 
6.1 Hypothesis 1a analysis: micro-
failures are not atypical 
 
A descriptive analysis of the results, gathered from 
the content analysis, has been implemented in Stata. 
The frequency of the relevant micro-failures 
categories is summarized in the following table 
(Table 5); moreover, the frequency can be considered 
separately according to the type of failing firms (i.e. 
fraud or no-tort, Figure 2). The accidental factors (i.e. 
category E) have no influence at all on firms‘ relevant 
micro-failures. Moreover, neither categories A 
(product/market problems) and D (cultural/social 
factors) have much influence. Overall (Table 6), the 
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five most frequent relevant micro-failure types are the 
following:  
• over-aggressive growth and expansion strategy 
(i.e. such rapid growth through mergers or other 
operations was not sustainable in the long run); this 
has been labeled C9; 
• excessive indebtedness and difficulty in 
obtaining new financing;  this has been labeled B2; 
• negative economic-financial trends (primarily 
resulting from a decrease in revenues); this has been 
labeled B4; 
• unprofitable affairs (e.g. acquisition of 
unprofitable divisions);  this has been labeled B6; 
• over-ambitious objectives and anxiety to hit 
"must make" numbers (i.e. earnings targets); this has 
been labeled C10. 
 
Table 5. Frequency of relevant micro-failures categories in both fraud and not-tort cases 
 
      Total           60      100.00
                                                
          D            1        1.67      100.00
          C           28       46.67       98.33
          B           27       45.00       51.67
          A            4        6.67        6.67
                                                
         of        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
CAT_RelMicr  
. tabulate cat_relmic
 
 
Figure 2 Frequency of relevant micro-failures categories in both fraud and not-tort cases 
 
 
 
Table 6. Frequency of relevant micro-failures types in both fraud and not-tort cases 
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There is a strict differentiation inside these 
micro-failures types according to the firms‘ status 
(fraud and no-tort): in no-tort cases financial micro-
failures outnumber managerial problems and vice 
versa in fraud cases. More specifically, while in no-
tort cases financial micro-failures (B2 and B4) 
outnumber all the others, in fraud cases the 
managerial relevant micro-failure type labeled C9 is 
the prevalent one. 
 
6.2 Hypothesis 1b analysis: macro-
failure does not occur suddenly 
 
In order to analyze this hypothesis, the time variable 
has been introduced: it represents the time interval 
between the relevant micro-failure date (d1) and 
macro-failure date (d3). So, this variable is not 
calculated from the beginning of the business path, 
but from its relevant micro-failure, which is the most 
reliable signal of failure as emphasized in Section II. 
Table 7 shows a first descriptive statistical analysis of 
the time variable. The path towards failure of the 
sampled firms ranges from 215 days (the minimum 
value) to 2722 days (the maximum value). The first  
distinction in the distribution of the time variable 
between no-tort and fraud cases can be read in the 
following tables (Tables 8-9): the minimum and the 
maximum values of the time variable are lower for 
no-tort cases. Moreover, the range between these last 
two values is shorter for no-tort cases: firms which 
have committed fraud are more distributed over time 
and their path towards macro-failure lasts longer. 
These considerations will be further investigated in 
the following analysis. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistical analysis of the time variable 
 
        time          60    945.4333    566.2778        215       2722
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize time
 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistical analysis of the time variable in fraud cases 
 
        time          30      1273.6    566.7232        512       2722
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum time if id<=30
 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistical analysis of the time variable in not-tort cases 
 
        time          30    617.2667    329.2562        215       1690
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum time if id>30
 
 
6.3 Hypothesis 2 analysis: fraud lets 
firms gain time in the path to macro-
failure 
 
Survival analysis includes several related techniques 
that focus on time until an event of interest occurs. In 
this paper, the time until macro-failure represents the 
―survival time‖ (Table 10). The median survival time 
is 753 days, considering all the 60 firms. Moreover, 
there are 60 failures out of 56726 firm-days, thus 
giving an incidence rate of 0.00106. If this incidence 
rate (i.e. the hazard function) could be assumed to be 
constant, it would be estimated as 0.00106 per day, 
which corresponds to 0.39 per year.  
 
 
Table 10. The survival time 
 
   total          56726   .0010577            60        527       753      1219
                                                                               
           time at risk     rate        subjects        25%       50%       75%
                         incidence       no. of            Survival time       
   analysis time _t:  time
         failure _d:  status
. stsum
 
 
Overall, this function estimates about a 25% 
chance of falling into macro-failure within 527 days 
after the relevant micro-failure, 50% within 753 days 
and 75% within 1219 days. Summary statistics on 
survival time are more significant if considered 
separately for each group (Table 11): overall, 25% of 
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sampled firms took at least 527 days from relevant 
micro-failure to fall into macro-failure, but this 
differs considerably  between fraud and no-tort cases 
(at least 391 days in no-tort cases and 926 in fraud 
cases). The median survival time in fraud cases is 
estimated to be 1182 days and 559 in no-tort cases.  
The previous conclusion, which has been reached by 
considering the time variable, is reversed by 
introducing the time2 variable (Table 12): this 
represents the period of time between the disclosure 
date (d2) and macro-failure date (d3). In this second 
case, the median survival time is equal to 312 days. If 
the incidence rate (i.e. the hazard function) could be 
assumed to be constant, it would be estimated as 
0.0025 per day, which corresponds to 0.91 per year. 
Overall, 25% of sampled firms took at least 99 days 
from disclosure moment to fall into macro-failure, but 
this differs considerably  (more than before with the 
time variable) between fraud and no-tort cases (at 
least 391 days in no-tort cases and 53 in fraud cases). 
This function estimates for fraud firms about a 25% 
chance of falling into macro-failure within 53 days 
after the disclosure moment and 75% within 215 
days. This function (Table 13) estimates for no-tort 
firms about a 25% chance of falling into macro-
failure within 391 days after the disclosure moment 
and 75% within 748 days. So, even though overall the 
path towards macro-failure lasts longer for fraud 
cases, after the disclosure moment firms that have 
committed fraud fall into macro-failure more rapidly 
than no-tort firms. This result can be confirmed by 
the Kaplan-Meier method (Table 14), which 
estimates the survivor function. Its estimator of 
surviving beyond time t is the product of survival 
probabilities in t and the preceding periods. The 
cumulative hazard function from the Kaplan-Meier 
method can be obtained by using the relationship 
between the survivor and hazard functions, but there 
are problems in small samples with this approach. It 
could be more appropriate to use the formula for the 
Nelson-Aalen estimator (Table 15). These results can 
be intuitively understood through a graph: graphing 
the Kaplan-Meier estimator of surviving S(t) against t 
produces a Kaplan-Meier survivor curve for each 
case (i.e. fraud and no-tort, Figures 3-4). 
 
 
Table 11. The survival time in not-tort and fraud cases 
 
   total          56726   .0010577            60        527       753      1219
                                                                               
       1          38208   .0007852            30        926      1182      1488
       0          18518     .00162            30        391       559       748
                                                                               
fraud      time at risk     rate        subjects        25%       50%       75%
                         incidence       no. of            Survival time       
   analysis time _t:  time
         failure _d:  status
. stsum, by(fraud)
 
 
Table 12. The disclosure-to-macrofailure time 
 
   total          23164   .0025471            59         99       312       614
                                                                               
           time at risk     rate        subjects        25%       50%       75%
                         incidence       no. of            Survival time       
   analysis time _t:  time2
         failure _d:  status
. stsum
 
 
Table 13. The disclosure-to-macrofailure time in not-tort and fraud cases 
 
   total          23164   .0025471            59         99       312       614
                                                                               
       1           4646   .0062419            29         53        99       215
       0          18518     .00162            30        391       559       748
                                                                               
fraud      time at risk     rate        subjects        25%       50%       75%
                         incidence       no. of            Survival time       
   analysis time _t:  time2
         failure _d:  status
. stsum, by(fraud)
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Table 14. Kaplan-Meier estimator for the time variable 
 
                                  
        3032          .          .
        2719          .     0.0333
        2406          .     0.0667
        2093          .     0.1000
        1780          .     0.1667
        1467     0.0333     0.2667
        1154     0.0667     0.5667
         841     0.1667     0.7667
         528     0.5333     0.9333
time     215     0.9667     1.0000
                                  
fraud                 0          1
                 Survivor Function
   analysis time _t:  time
         failure _d:  status
. sts list, by(fraud) compare
 
 
Table 15. Nelson-Aalen estimator for the time variable 
 
                                  
        3032          .          .
        2719          .     2.9950
        2406          .     2.4950
        2093          .     2.1617
        1780          .     1.7117
        1467     2.9950     1.2771
        1154     2.4950     0.5554
         841     1.7117     0.2607
         528     0.6143     0.0678
time     215     0.0333     0.0000
                                  
fraud                 0          1
            Nelson-Aalen Cum. Haz.
   analysis time _t:  time
         failure _d:  status
. sts list, by(fraud) compare na
 
 
Figure 3. Kaplan-Meier estimator for the time variable 
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Figure 4. Nelson-Aalen estimator for the time variable 
 
 
 
After the relevant micro-failure, macro-failure 
occurs more quickly in no-tort cases (i.e. fraud equals 
zero): the path towards macro-failure lasts longer in 
fraud cases (i.e. fraud equals one). 
The same analysis (Tables 16-17) can be 
implemented for time2 variable. After the disclosure 
moment, macro-failure occurs more quickly in fraud 
cases (i.e. fraud equals one, Figures 5-6): the interval 
of time between the disclosure moment and the 
macro-failure date lasts more in no-tort (i.e. fraud 
equals zero). 
 
 
Table 16. Kaplan-Meier estimator for the time2 variable 
 
                                  
        1896          .          .
        1686     0.0333          .
        1476     0.0333          .
        1266     0.0667          .
        1056     0.1000          .
         846     0.1667          .
         636     0.3333     0.0345
         426     0.7333     0.0690
         216     0.9667     0.2414
time       6     1.0000     0.9655
                                  
fraud                 0          1
                 Survivor Function
   analysis time _t:  time2
         failure _d:  status
. sts list, by(fraud) compare
 
 
Table 17. Nelson-Aalen estimator for the time2 variable 
 
                                  
        1896          .          .
        1686     2.9950          .
        1476     2.9950          .
        1266     2.4950          .
        1056     2.1617          .
         846     1.7117          .
         636     1.0660     2.9595
         426     0.3042     2.4595
         216     0.0333     1.3666
time       6     0.0000     0.0345
                                  
fraud                 0          1
            Nelson-Aalen Cum. Haz.
   analysis time _t:  time2
         failure _d:  status
. sts list, by(fraud) compare na
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Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier estimator for the time2 variable 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Nelson-Aalen estimator for the time2 variable 
 
 
 
7 Main conclusion and suggestions for 
future research 
 
Essentially, this paper has sought to encourage a new 
explanation of business failure through the 
identification of two different steps in the failing 
path: the first, i.e. micro-failure, is not atypical and 
the second, i.e. macro-failure, does not occur 
suddenly. Their consideration will help scholars in 
the explanation of also fraud happening: fraud allows 
firms to gain time and hope to avoid macro-failure, 
but, after the disclosure moment, fraud firms fall into 
macro-failure faster than no-tort firms. 
The results suggest that only after such an 
explanation of business failure can its prediction be 
properly conducted: in the near future, the author 
aims to utilize the existing methods of prediction in 
the light of the developed explanation to predict 
macro-failure when the relevant micro-failure is 
disclosed. In addition, other suggestions for future 
research regard two sampled cases which have been 
emphasized at the end of the survival analysis 
through an analysis of the deviance residuals: it will 
be interesting to go into greater depth through a 
specific accounting history analysis. Moreover, the 
author would like to overcome some limitations of 
the present paper through future work: this 
contribution regards only American fraud and no-tort 
cases whose activities differ from the finance, 
insurance and real estate division. The implemented 
analysis does not consider the possibility that failing 
firms may commit fraud and become once again 
successful cases without having to disclose such 
improper accounting methods. These cases are very 
difficult to identify. Only deeper investigation of the 
subject (inside the history of failing firms, their minor 
events and their stakeholders‘ actions) may help such 
identification: this paper represents an initial 
contribution to this type of approach and towards a 
new explanation of business failure. 
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